Probability measures by themselves are known to be inappropriate for modeling the dynamics of plain belief and their excessively s � ong measura bility constraints make them unsmtable for some representational tasks, e.g. in the context of frrst order knowledge. In this paper, we are therefore going to look for possible alternatives and ex tensions. We begin by delimiting the general area of interest, proposing a minimal list of as � ump tions to be satisfied by any reasonable quasi-pro babilistic valuation concept. Within this frame work, we investigate two particularly interesting kinds of quasi-measures which are not or much less affected by the traditional problems.
INTRODUCTION
The successful acting of cognitive agents in complex, opaque and dynamic worlds depends on their ability � o manipulate huge amounts of incomplete and unc_ertam in fonnation in a reasonable way. The representatJon of soft and partial knowledge together with the fonnaliza tion of the corresponding reasoning patterns are therefore major issues in artificial intelligence. Very roughly, �e can distinguish the following approaches to the modelmg of belief, i. [Shafer 76 ].
• Semi-quantitative or semi-qualitative. . . For most proposals, there are more or less _ s � itable application contexts, but altogether the � �s? exhtbtt so � e more or less serious shortcomings. Prionuzed sententtal belief models are interesting because of their simplicity and the absence of omniscience assumptions, but the lacking semantic foundations and the resulting ad hoc character relativize their usefulness. More generally, strictly qualitative syntax-or semantic-based comparative frameworks are not fine-grained enough to handle the complexities of real-world knowledg � . For instanc � , we cannot easily model belief strength differences or mde pendency constraints and our decision-theoretic conside rations have to stay rather rudimentary.
Among the numerical approaches, probability theory is certainly the best investigated and most successful formalism for modeling uncertain propositional know ledge. Even if its naive use mi � ht sometimes cause problems, it still appears to be the Ideal reference fonna
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• There are intuitive flaws, for insL.mce the gap between impossibility and probability 0 or the nonexistence of uniform distributions on countably infinite sets.
To a certain extent, all these problems can be solved in semi-qualitative quasi-probabilistic formal accounts based on abstract ranking measures. Their characteristic feature is that the value associated with the union of two sets is assumed to be, w.r.t. a given ranking order, just the maxi mum of the values attributed to the individual sets. This means less commitments by lower precision. Homo geneous countably infinite sets and proper impossibility are no longer barred and every ranking measure can be lif ted to the full power set. Related concepts have been used fairly successfully for multiple revisions of plain belief [Spohn 88 In this paper, we are going to develop such an inte grated approach by considering natural generalizations of probability measures. We shall proceed in four steps. To begin with, we shall delimit the area of interest and single out the minimal conditions for reasonable quasi-proba bilistic valuation formalisms. Next, we shall introduce and discuss two particularly interesting subclasses of non classical quasi-measures. On one hand, we have the ran king measures, a coarse-grained semi-qualitative notion. On the other hand, we have the cumulative measures, a fine-grained extended quantitative-qualitative measure concept, which tries to accumulate the best of both worlds. To conclude, we shall sketch how cumulative measures may be used to model st. ' ltic and dynamic belief.
QUASI-MEASURES
Traditional probabilistic measure spaces can be seen as triples of the form (� 1 P 1 V), where :8 = (B, u, n, -, 0, 1) is a a-algebra of events, i.e. a boolean algebra closed under countable joins (unions) and meets (intersections) with top 1 and bottom 0, V = (IR+, +, x, 0, 1, <) is the positive half of the ordered real number field, and the probability measure P is a function from B to I R+ s.t. P(1) = 1 and P(uA i ) =I. P(A i ) for every countable set of n-disjoint A i (a-additivity). For each such space, there is a corresponding conditional probability measure P( I ) : B
x 8° -> fR + , which verifies :P(A r1 B)= 'P(A I B) x P(B)
for B E 8° = {BE B I P(B) "# 0}. In the context of P, At ... A n are called (conditionally) independent given B E 8° iffP(riA ij I B)= :P(A i l I B) x . . . x 'P(A is I B) for each subsequence An ... A is of At ... A n .
Our first task now will be to see how far we can relax all these requirements without giving up practical relevance for belief valuation or basic features of the proba bility calculus. In particular, we want to keep reasonable notions of conditioning and independency. On the other hand, our framework should be general enough to cover semi-qualitative Spohn-type formalisms like those in troduced for modeling defaults and revision. In the follo wing, we are going to propose a minimal list of assump tions to be satisfied by any structure claiming to support a reasonable form of generalized probabilistic reasoningl. Before, let's recall some useful algebraic notions.
(G, *) is called a semi-group iff G ::F 0 and * is an associative operation on G. In (G, *),we call e neutral or the identity iff for all x E G, e * x = x * e = x and n absorptive iff for all x E G, x * n = n * x = n. A semi group (G, *) is a group iff it has an identity e and for all xEG, there is y E G s.t. x * y = y * x =e. (G, *·<) is called an ordered group iff (G, *) is a group, < is a linear ordering on G and for all x, x', y E G, x < x' implies x * y < x' * y).
Definition 2.1 (�1 R1 V) is a quasi-measure space with event algebra :8 = (8, u, n, -, 0, 1), valuation algebra V = (V, #, " , n, e, «) (generalizing (IR+, +, x, 0, 1, <)) and quasi-measureR. : B -> V iff the postulates 1.0 -1.9 hold 1.0 Boolean structure :
The usual propositional connectives are fundamental rea soning tools. Infinitary closures are quite exotic. Induced by the boolean properties of u and 0 together with the 1.1 characterization of R.. Strictly speaking, this requirement only concerns the possible values of R., but we are going to extrapolate these algebraic properties to the whole structure.
1.3 Multiplicative structure : (V, c ) is a commutative semi-group with identity e and absorptive n.
Based on the boolean properties of n, 0, 1 and the desire to set :R(A n B) = :R(A) c :R(B) for intuitively inde- pendent events A, B (• is meant to play the role of x), in particular for A, B E { 0, 1 } .
Backed by the distributivity of n over u and our conside rations above.
1.5 Linearity : (V, «) is a linear ordering.
For decision-theoretic reasons and formal convenience. If necessary, we can model partiality by sets of valuations.
1.6 Additive monotony :
Suggested by the monotonic character of measures. To ac count for ranking measures, we need the weak version � -
Conditioning on an independent, non-empty event should not affect «-relationships.
1.8 Additive accessibility :
It should be possible to attribute an arbitrary lower value to a proper subvent (valuation freedom). Then, the prin ciple follows from 1.1.
Multiplicative accessibility
This condition is necessary if we accept valuation free dom and want a suitable conditional version of R.
To get a better understanding of these structures, we now consider some interesting easy consequences, e.g. the fact that !f or « can be defined from • .
Theorem 2.1 Assuming 1.0 -1.9, we have,
Proof:
1. By multiplicative accessibility, v « n would impy that there is a w s.t. v = o a w = n, which is impossible.
Using linearity, this gives usn� v.
2.
Because of multiplicative accessibility, we only have to show uniqueness. Suppose, we had v � v', v' "#nand sume w « w'. But this would contradict multiplicative monotony.
3. Given n !f v' and v' a n = n, 2.1.2 allows us to infer from v' • v = n and v' "# n that v = n.
4.
If there is a w s.t. v' " w = v and w � e, either v = n � v', and we are done, or n « v, v', w (by 2.1.1, 2.1.3). Now, suppose that v' « v and consequently w «e. Then multiplicative monotony would give us v' 
5. Multiplicative monotony and n « v, v' � e imply that n=n•�«v·��ea�=��� 6. By 2.1.1 and additive monotony, n �R(
Now we are able to give an explicit definition of condi tioning for quasi-measures.
Definition 2.2 For every quasi-measure space(�, R1
We can justify this denotation by the following result.
is also a quasi-measure space.
Proof:
We only have to verify 1.1. Obviously R(O I B)= n, R(1 I B) = e. What we still must prove is that R(
Assuming n "# e, the relevant ordered multiplicative sub structure of a giv' en valuation algebra V is characterized by the restriction of (V, ",«) to the interval ]n, e] « . Set Proof : Based on our definitions and 2.1.5, it is pos sible to show that I(V) is an ordered commutative semi-group with identity and minimum e. Now, exploi-ting 2.1.2 (for inverse uniqueness), we cllil use a well known technique -integer construction from the na tural numbers -to built llil ordered commutative group (G, • ', «') whose positive half is isomorphic to I(V).
One way to distinguish valuation algebras is to consider the interaction patterns they induce between # and «. So, for every valuation context, we would like to know how much we have to add to an abstract quantity to get a bigger one. This amounts to investigate for every valuation algebra V = (V, #, �, n, e, «) the corresponding additive magnitude ordering ««, defined by v «« w iff w # v = w. It is easy to see that «« "' � (by additive monotony) is both transitive (associativity of#) and anti symmetric (commutativity of #), but not n· ecessarily reflexive, e.g. if V = (IR + , + , x, 0, 1, <).Notice however that n «« n. Furthermore, it follows from additive mono tony and accessibility that<«< is .li-extendible, i.e. if v .5i x «« x' S! v', then we get v «« v' (by additive accessibility, v' = x' # w and therefore v'
In general, «« is much coarser than .li· Setting S(w) = { v I v «« w}, by extendibility an initial .5i-segment, there are basically three possibilities for each w :
we are going to show that it is enough to consider w :::: : e. In the following, let S P, S H and SR be the principles obtained by stating (1}, (2) resp. (3) for w =e.
Tbeorem 2.4 If n "# e, for i = 1, 2, 3, (i) holds for e iff (i) holds for all x ::F. n.
The right-to-left direction is obvious.
(1) Suppose S(e) = {n} and n "# x = x # y for some y "# n. W.I.o.g. we may assume y � x, otherwise, additive monotony would give us x S! x # x S! x # y = x and we could replace y by x. By multiplicative accessibility, there is v ::
which is impossible. Hence, (1) must hold for all x ::F. n.
(2) Suppose x i= n and e = e # v « e # e for some v with
(3) From e = e # e, we get x = x • (e # e)= x # x. That is, (3) is valid for alllL It seems natural to assume that «« should define a linear hierarchy of additive magnitudes. This amounts to require that «« should be a (transitive) modular ordering, i.e. for each w, v «« v' should imply w <«< v ' or v «« w. Definition 3.1 C8, R., V) is called a ranking-measure space iff
1. � = (B, u, n, -, 0, 1) is a boolean algebra 2. V = (V, a,«) (ranking algebra) is s.t.
• (V\{ n}, •, ») is the positive half of an ordered commutative group with identity e, • n is «-minimal and absorptive for c. Observe that coherence is automatically satisfied for com pact boolean algebras (i.e. where every covering of an event has a finite subcovering). What we still have to prove is that ranking measures really fit into our general quasi-measure framework. Theorem 3.2 Let ClS, :R., V) be a ranking measure space where lS is a set algebra on S, the valuation ordering « is complete (i.e. «-infima exist) and n « inf « 1 :R.(P) J P E B, n « :R.(P) }. Then there is a canonical extension :R. * of :R.
to the powerset structure lS* = (2S, u, n, -, 0. S) on S s.t. < :8 *, :R. *, V) is a ranking measure space and :R. * is the maximal extension w.r.t. the «-induced pointwise or dering on ranking-measures from lS * to v.
Proof sketch : :R. * defined by :R *(A) = in�< { :R.(P) I A � P, P E B} for A� Sis as desired. Because conditional possibility measures are defined through min, stronger c-like connectives are not con sidered. Spohn's account and possibility theory both assume that their measures are fully additive, i.e. R(A) = sup«{:R.({a}) I a E A). However, this shouldn't be a general postulate. If we want to avoid an infinitary form of the lottery paradox, we will need semi-quantitative measures :R. compatible with homogeneously small sin gletons, i.e. with v E V s.t. R( {a})= v « e for all a E S.
CUMULATIVE MEASURES
Probabilistic and ranking measures are situated at the extremes of the quasi-measure range. Both fairly popular, they are characterized by different strengths and weak nesses. Probabilities are well suited for a fine-grained , e.g. decision-theoretic analysis in finite or continuous contexts where precise numbers are available. For their semi-qualitative counterparts, quite the opposite is true. They are most appropriate when we are interested in a simple, cheap, rough, mainly number-free evaluation of plausibility, e.g. in default reasoning or (full) belief revi sian. When modeling plain belief, for instance, we want to avoid any confidence loss when conjoining two beliefs. Within the classical probabilistic framework, this can only be achieved by attributing measure zero to -, <p if <p is believed. However. when we have to revise our beliefs based on new evidence supporting -,<p we get into trouble bec� � s � subsets of a null set cannot be differentiated pro babilJstJcally. For ranking measures, this problem doesn't arise. Here, believing <p means associating a non-ma ximal, but not necessarily minimal ranking measure value to --, <p. This guarantees that beliefs are closed under co � junction. At the same time, Spohn-type conditionali zatiOn allows us to formulate reasonable revision pro cedures. Furthermore, we do no longer have to care about measurability constraints, the prohibition of uniform countable sample spaces and the representation of im possibility. On �he other hand, everybody will agree that the repres _ entatwnal a � d inferential power of ranking measures ts rather restricted. In fact, it seems as if both formalisms were largely complementary. Consequently, we should try to combine them in a powerful framework sharing the basic advantages of both.
The major issue is to extend the usual probabilistic framework far enou gh to allow differentiation among and especially con dit ionin g on sets of vanishing probability. The idea is to introduce a hierarchy of mainly classical valu ation contexts such that from the perspective of any gi ven level, lower ranks are con sider ed negligible or ir relevant, i.e. would get probability zero within a standard interpretation. Our strategy i s to use a ranking algebra V = (V. c. «) for describing the rough, global hierarchical structure and the real probabilistic valuation algebra :R+ = (IR + , +, x, 0, 1, <),i.e. the standard positive real n um ber algebra, for the more conventional, fine-grained local structure. The main task is now to merge these structures in a suitable way. This is done by the fo llo wing defini tion .
Definition 4.1 LetV" = (V0, max « , c0, n o . e0, «0) be a ranking and '.R.+ = (IR+, +, x, 0, 1, <)be the real valuation algebra. Then we call H(V0, R+) = (H(V0, '.R.+), #, c, n, e, «) a cumulative algebra with global structure V0 and local structure R.+ iff • H(V0, R + ) := { (n, 0)} u V'\{n}xlR+ \{0}, and for all (a, r), (a', r') E H(V0, R+ ),
if a «0a', ::; (a, r) if a' «0a,
• (a, r) c (a', r') = (a c 0 a ', r x r'),
• n=(n°,0)ande =(e0,1),
• (a, r) «(a', r') iff a «0a' or (a= a' and a< a').
The definition of H(V0, :.R +) as a proper subset of V0xlR+ excluding (n°, r) for r t:. 0 and (a, 0) for a 1= n° ensure s that there are no zero-divisors (x, y t:. n w it h x c y = n, e.g. for x = (a, 0) and y = (n°, r)) or trivial violations of multiplicative monotony by (a, 0) * n, (e, r) « (e, 1) and (a, 0) c (e, r) =(a, 0) c (e, 1). For the multiplicative con nective, the componentwise strategy is the obvious one to guarantee those properties which are required for enco din g independency (cf part 2). The lexicographic order ing reflects our basic stratification philosophy. Finding an appropriate additive connective, however, is less straight forward. Within single ranks (a = a'), we must adopt the pointwise approach (a, r) #(a', r') =(max « {a, a'}, r + r'), because distributivity and the intended isomorphism bet ween { e} xR+ \{ 0} and R+ \ { 0 I (i.e. real valuation algebra at the top) allow the derivation of (a, r) # (a, r') = ((a, 1) c ( e, r)) #((a, 1) c (e, r')) =(a, 1) c ((e, r) # (e, r')) =(a, 1) c (e, r + r') = (a, r + r'). But additions in vo lvin g different ranks cannot be handled that way. To satisfy additive ac cessibility, e.g. to pass from (a, 1) with a «0e to the bigger value (e, r) for r < 1, we would have to introduce negative num be rs on the right-hand-side, which simply doesn't make sense. In fact, it would again bring in oddities like (a, 0) for at:. n°. Notice that multiplicative acces sibili ty already has brought us to consider (a, r) with 1 < r to get from (e, 1/r) to (a, 1). Taking all these precautions, our structures are well-behaved.
Theorem 4.1 Cumulative algebras are hierarchical valua tion algebras. They verify S H if the ranking algebra is no n-trivial (V0# {D0, e0}).
Proof: Let H(V0 , :.R+) = (H(V0, R+), #, c, n, e, «) be a cumulative algebr a.
1. Jl.(V0, R+) is a valuation algebra.
1.2 Additive structure. Commutat ivit y and the neutrality of n::: (n°, 0) are obvious. To see that associativity holds, consider any ((a, r) #(a', r')) #(a", r") and (a, r) #((a', r') # (a", r")). If one left component is bigger than the other two, the sums are just identical to the corresponding pair.
If the left components are equal, we can use the associa tivity of +. If only two of them are iden tical and the remaining one is smaller, we can drop the associated pair and the above expressions become equal to the sum of the former .
1.3 Multiplicative structure. Obvious because of the co r responding properties for (V0, c0) and (IR+, x).
1.4Distributivity. If a' =a", then (a,r) c ((a', r')#(a",r"))= (a o0a', r X (r' + r")) := (ac0a' ,r X r' + r xr") = (ac0a', r X r') # (a c 0a", r x r") = ((a, r) c (a', r')) # ((a, r) c (a ", r ")).
If a' «0a", then (a, r) c ((a', r') #(a", r")) =(a, r) c (a", r") = ((a, r) c (a', r')) # ((a, r) " (a", r")) by the multiplicative monotony of o0 or, if a= no and r = 0, by absorption.
1.5 Linearity. Follows directly from that of «0 and <.
rem ainin g possibilities are immediate.
1.7 Multiplicative monotony. Immediate from the multi plicative monotony ofV0 and R+ and n = (n°, 0).
1.8 Additive accessibility. If (a, r) « (a', r'), then we have either a��o a' and (a, r) #(a', r') =(a', r'), or a= a' and r < r ' and the additive accessibility of 1t+ gives us r" with (a, r) #(a, r") = (a', r').
1.9 Multiplicative accessibility. By the corresponding fea ture ofV0 and :.R+ and t he definition of H(V0, R.+)· 2. Jl.(V0, :.R+) is hierarchical. (a, r) «« (a', r') iff (a', r') # (a, r) = (a', r') iff a «0a' or (a, r) = (n°, 0), which describes a modular relation.
3. SH holds. (e0, 1) #(a, r) = (e0, 1) for some (a, r) with (n°, 0) « (a, r) « (e0, 1), which exists by V0's nontriviality.
The next defmition now introduces our main concept. instances of cumulative measure spaces. Basically, his approach has been designed for finite boolean algebras, but -to a certain extent -it can be generalized to infinite ones. The idea is to have a possibility ranking on atoms and a probability measure 1l r attached to each level r which vanishes for measurable propositions built up from atom s of other ranks. Given an event A, we look for the highest rank r where its probability 1l r (A) becomes stric tly positive. Boutilier doesn't present a fu lly integrated account with combined valuation scales , but in our termi nology, A would get the value (r, 1l r (A)).
The approach, as it stands, has several shortcomings.
First of all , it relies on possibility measures, which are not general enough for some purposes (e.g. for modeling infmite boolean algebras based on countably many small atoms). Secondly, his definition forces us to use well founded rankings, which seems to be a quite artificial res triction. In fact, the only well-founded ranking algebras are V(Z) and the trivial one. But the main problem with Boutilier's theory is that it doesn't really fit into the quasi measure framework. Because the local values are sup-plied by probabilistic valuations, they cannot exceed 1.
Consequently, multiplicative accessibility will fai l, i.e. there will be no smooth account of conditional measures and our valuation freedom will be severely restricted. For instance, we may encounter valuated events, less "pro bable" than their complements, for which there can't be another event which is exactly two times as "probable". So, it seems justified to say that Boutilier's formalism achieves only a partial integration of the quantitative and the qualitative viewpoint. First of all, we have to address the question about the nature of epistemic states. Here, we want to adopt a libe ral attitude. Epistemic states should not be identified with any kind of measures. This would be an oversimplifica tion contradicting our subjective experience of what cons titutes real-world belief (inconsistency, partiality, vague ness, mixture of qualitative and quantitative contents, deductive incompleteness, ... ). What we will assume, however, is that any given epistemic state s can be inter preted or evaluated so as to provide a cumulative measure 'Rs describing the corresponding official, surface belief structure, to be exploited for practical purposes like decision-tasks. This approach might be call ed the projec tion model of belief. The domain of Rs is fo rmed by the prop ositions of our actual language (state) u, which we assume to be boolean . The valuation algebm is assumed to be non-trivial . Backed by the pleasant properties of cumulative measures, we can now represent plain belief in the traditional way without having to care ab out the shortcomings of the probabilistic account. Let's express "within the epistemic state s, A is plainly believed" by s I= B(A). In first-order contexts, it is easy to imagine situations where the additive structure of clas sical valuation algebras becomes inappropriate. For ins tance, let 'l'(x) be an opaque number-theoretic property for which we know that there is exactly one solution, but where we cannot give any bounds. Then, it seems reason able to adopt a symmetric attitude, which can easily be realized within our cumulative framework. Let's assume that .Ls is powerful enough to express 'P(.n.), the .n. being natural number constants.
BELIEF STRUCTURES

Infinitary uniformity �
:Rs('l'(Q)) = :Rs('l'(l)) = ... = {a, 1) «« {e0, 1), e.g.
In addition, we need of course a possibly nondeterministic revision mechanism N which , given an epistemic state s 
Top-conditionalization :
Rs'(B) = Rs(B I A) if :Rs(B I A) has the form (e 0 , r)
We cannot require full conditionalization because this would force us to accept :Rs'(--,A) = :RS: --,A I A) = (0°, 0), precluding nontrivial updating with -,A. That is, we would be confronted again to the problems of the tradi tional framework, we want to escape.
